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Importance Measures for Non-Coherent-System
Analysis
Sally Beeson and John D. Andrews
Abstract—Component importance analysis is a key part of the
system reliability quantification process. It enables the weakest
areas of a system to be identified and indicates modifications,
which will improve the system reliability. Although a wide range of
importance measures have been developed, the majority of these
measures are strictly for coherent system analysis. Non-coherent
systems can occur and accurate importance analysis is essential.
This paper extends four commonly used measures of importance,
using the noncoherent extension of Birnbaum’s measure of
component reliability importance. Since both component failure
and repair can contribute to system failure in a noncoherent
system, both of these influences need to be considered. This paper
highlights that it is crucial to choose appropriate measures to
analyze component importance. First the aims of the analysis
must be outlined and then the roles that component failures and
repairs can play in system state deterioration can be considered.
For example, the failure/repair of components in safety systems
can play only a passive role in system failure, since it is usually
inactive, hence measures that consider initiator importance are
not appropriate to analyze the importance of these components.
Measures of importance must be chosen carefully to ensure
analysis is meaningful and useful conclusions can be drawn.
Index Terms—Fault tree, importance measure, noncoherent,
structure function.
ACRONYMS1
B&P Barlow and Proschan
C controller
CS cut set
FC failure critical
FT fault tree
FV Fussell-Vesely
I1 ignition source
IV isolation valve
LF leaking flange
LP leaking pipe
N/A not applicable
PRV pressure-relief valve
RC repair critical
- statistical(ly)
SF system failure
SWS system is in a working state
Manuscript received June 8, 2001; revised June 1, 2002. Responsible Editor:
J. H. Lambert.
The authors are with the Department of Systems Engineering, Lough-
borough University, Loughborough LE11 3TU, U.K. (e-mail: J.D.An-
drews@lboro.ac.uk).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TR.2003.816397
1The singular and plural of an acronym are always spelled the same.
NOTATION
prime-implicant set for noncoherent systems;
minimal CS for coherent systems
Birnbaum measure of component-reliability im-
portance
component-failure criticality: SWS such
that failure of component causes SF
component-repair criticality: SWS such that
repair of component causes SF
SWS such that components and are FC
SWS such that component is FC and com-
ponent is RC
SWS such that component is RC and com-
ponent is FC
SWS such that components and are RC
SWS such that components and are FC,
and the failure of either or is sufficient to cause
SF
SWS state such that component is FC and
component is RC, and the failure of or the
repair of alone is sufficient to cause SF
SWS such that component is RC and com-
ponent is FC, and the repair of or the failure
of alone is sufficient to cause SF
SWS such that components and are RC,
and the repair of either or alone is sufficient
to cause SF
structure function: system state in terms of the
system components-states
component-failure criticality measure
component-repair criticality measure
FV of component importance
FV measure of component-failure importance
FV measure of component-repair importance
B&P measure of initiator importance
Component-Initiator failure importance
Component-Initiator repair importance
Component-Enabler importance
component-failure enabler importance
component-repair enabler importance
failure rate
total number of prime-implicant sets or minimal
CS
total number of components in prime-implicant
set
total number of components in a system
total number of component-failure initiators
total number of component-repair initiators
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: working probability of component
: failure probability of component
average unavailability
system unavailability function: system is in
a failed state at time
modified unavailability function
system fails with component failed
system fails with component working
mean time to repair
test or inspection interval
mean number of SF in
: unconditional failure intensity of compo-
nent
: unconditional repair importance of compo-
nent failure
I. INTRODUCTION
R ISK and reliability assessment techniques have developedover many years to meet the needs of industries such as the
nuclear and oil industries; failure of safety systems in a nuclear
power plant or on an offshore platform can have catastrophic
consequences. Many regulatory bodies have now incorporated
quantified risk assessment into safety requirements, to ensure
that the risk of SF is as low as practicable.
Many techniques for risk and reliability assessment have been
developed. One of the most popular is FT Analysis [1], [2],
a deductive technique involving both qualitative and quantita-
tive analysis. Qualitative analysis identifies the minimal CS, (or
prime implicant sets in the case of noncoherent systems). Quan-
titative analysis involves quantification of the system unavail-
ability and unreliability parameters and the analysis of compo-
nent and/or minimal cut-set importance.
A FT is constructed by linking component states (usually
failure modes) by gates (logical operators). The fundamental
gates used during construction are AND gate, OR gate, and NOT
gate. The construction process determines whether the FT struc-
ture is coherent, containing only AND gates and OR gates, or
potentially noncoherent if it contains the NOT gate. A struc-
ture is noncoherent when its does not comply with the fol-
lowing definition of coherency [3], [4]:
1) Every component , is relevant to the system
state:
2) The structure function is monotonically increasing (non-
decreasing)
Andrews [5] demonstrated that for systems, such as multi-
tasking systems, the use of NOT logic was essential for a mean-
ingful analysis. The consideration of NOT logic during FT con-
struction often results in a noncoherent FT. Numerous algo-
rithms for identifying the prime implicant sets of the FT, and
more recently techniques enabling system unavailability and un-
reliability to be calculated, have been developed for this circum-
stance [6], [7]. However, importance analysis of noncoherent
FT has received little attention. [8] attempts to extend some
measures of importance; however, this extension of Birnbaum’s
measure was shown to be conceptually incorrect, rendering the
extension of the other measures, based on this measure, incor-
rect. [9] extends Birnbaum’s measure of importance to enable
analysis of noncoherent systems.
This paper provides noncoherent extensions to 4 commonly
used measures of importance; 3 of these measures are based
on Birnbaum’s measure of importance: component criticality,
B&P measure of Initiator importance, and Lambert’s measure
of Enabler importance. The fourth measure to be extended is the
FV measure of component importance.
When the various extensions are introduced, a simple
system with 5 prime implicants is used to demonstrate how
these measures are calculated. These 5 prime implicants are:
The Boolean expression obtained from these prime impli-
cants is:
(1)
The system unavailability can be obtained using the method out-
lined in [6]:
(2)
II. MEASURES OF IMPORTANCE
Importance analysis is a part of the system quantification
process which enables the analyst to rank the contribution that
each component provides to SF, and thus identify the weakest
areas of the system. Efforts to improve reliability can then be
concentrated on those areas whose contribution indicates that
by upgrading them, the maximum improvement in system relia-
bility can be achieved. Importance measures assign a numerical
value between 0 and 1 to each system component or minimal
CS; the 1 signifies the highest level of importance. This signifies
system susceptibility to component or minimal cut-set failure.
Numerous measures of importance have been developed to en-
able analysts to assess the roles a component failure can play
in the deterioration of the system state. For example, the B&P
Initiator importance measure considers the role that component
failures play in causing SF, whereas the Lambert Enabler impor-
tance measure is concerned with the indirect role that a compo-
nent failure plays in allowing other components to cause SF.
Measures of importance can be categorized as either deter-
ministic or probabilistic. Deterministic measures assess the im-
portance of a component or minimal cut-set without considering
component reliability. Although these measures can be useful
early in the design phase when information concerning compo-
nent-failure probability is limited, generally probabilistic mea-
sures of importance are preferred because they provide more-
valuable information.
BEESON AND ANDREWS: IMPORTANCE MEASURES FOR NON-COHERENT-SYSTEM ANALYSIS 303
Probabilistic measures of importance can be further catego-
rized as either ‘measures concerned with system unreliability
(contributing to failure frequency)’ or ‘measures concerned
with system unavailability (contributing to failure probability)’.
There is a clear and important distinction between the informa-
tion the various measures of importance provide; consequently,
measures must be chosen to suit the objectives of the study
being performed.
Reliability an item, system, or component operates
without failure for a stated period of time, under specified con-
ditions .
Availability an item, system, or component can per-
form its required function at a particular time .
System availability is only of interest when SF can be
tolerated; for hazardous industries, SF can be catastrophic; in
such cases system unreliability must be assessed as opposed
to system unavailability. For reliable systems, the unreliability
can be approximated by the -expected number of SF.
III. BIRNBAUM’S MEASURES AND ITS EXTENSION FOR
NON-COHERENT ANALYSIS
Birnbaum introduced a probabilistic measure of component
reliability importance [10]: component is critical to SF
the system is residing in a critical state for a compo-
nent, such that its failure causes SF :
(3)
The system unavailability can be calculated using the method
outlined in [6]. In addition to providing an important measure in
its own right, this measure also forms the basis for other mea-
sures of importance, including the measure of component crit-
icality, B&P measure of component Initiator importance, and
Lambert’s measure of component Enabler importance.
When analyzing noncoherent FT, both the ‘component
failed states’ and ‘component working states’ can contribute
to SF. Hence failed and working states occur in the prime
implicant sets and consequently in the system unavailability
function. Thus, to calculate a component is critical to
SF , it is necessary to consider both component-failure and
component-repair. Birnbaum’s failure (repair) criticality for
component is calculated by considering only the role that
event , and event , have in SF;
• event the failed state of component ,
• event the working state of component .
In mathematical equations,
a component works . and can be either relia-
bility or availability,
a component does not work , and can be either
unreliability or unavailability.
[9] develops an extension of Birnbaum’s measure for the
analysis of noncoherent systems. From this, expressions for
the failure criticality, repair criticality, and total criticality,
can be obtained: (4)–(6). These equations hold provided that
Henley and Inagaki’s method was used to calculate .
A component is FC at time if and only if the system is in a
working state such that the failure of component causes the
system to fail.
(4)
Similarly a component is RC at time if and only if the system
is in a working state such that the repair of component causes
the system to fail. Repair criticality for component is given in
(5).
(5)
During a ‘noncoherent system analysis’ the role of compo-
nent failure and the role of component repair are considered sep-
arately. The overall contribution of component is then:
(6)
Consider the Boolean expression introduced earlier for the ex-
ample system; the system unavailability function is given in (2).
As an example calculation for Birnbaum’s measure of im-
portance for component , the failure and repair importance are
calculated using (4) and (5), and are then summed.
IV. THE COMPONENT CRITICALITY MEASURE
For coherent systems, the component criticality measure is
defined as: the probability that component is critical to the
system and has failed, weighted by the system unavailability
at time , viz,
(7)
When analysis is noncoherent, then component-failure and
component-repair can cause SF; hence an expression for
failure-importance and repair-importance must be obtained.
For this measure of importance, failure importance
component is FC to the system; and has failed, weighted by the
system unavailability . Equation (8) is the criticality measure
of failure importance:
(8)
Similarly, repair importance component is success (re-
pair) critical to the system; and is in a working state, weighted by
the system unavailability . Equation (9) is the criticality mea-
sure of repair importance:
(9)
The overall importance of a component is obtained by summing
its failure and repair contributions.
To demonstrate the calculation procedure for this measure,
consider the Boolean expression (1). Birnbaum’s repair and
failure measures have already been calculated and an expres-
sion for the system unavailability function has been obtained;
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thus it is a simple matter of substitution to calculate the repair
and failure criticality measure for component . From (8) and
(9):
V. FV MEASURE OF COMPONENT IMPORTANCE
For coherent systems, the FV measure of component impor-
tance [11] is concerned with component failures contributing
to SF. This measure is defined as a minimal cs containing
component causes SF , and is given in (10).
(10)
This measure can be extended to noncoherent analysis. The FV
failure importance the failed state of component con-
tributes to SF ; see (11).
(11)
Similarly the FV repair importance is defined the working
state of component contributes to SF , weighted by the system
unavailability:
(12)
The calculation of the FV measure does not involve Birnbaum’s
measure; instead the prime implicant sets of the system are con-
sidered. Consider the Boolean expression in (1).
To calculate the failure importance of component , the prime
implicants sets containing are identified, and then (11) is ap-
plied. Similarly, to find the repair importance of component ,
the prime implicants sets containing are identified, and then
(12) is applied.
VI. MEASURES OF INITIATOR AND ENABLER IMPORTANCE
The 2 measures considered in Sections IV and V, the Crit-
icality and the FV measures, are both suitable for system un-
availability analysis, and both consider the events which need
to exist to fail the system. The and measures,
on the other hand, analyze the role of component failures in
causing and contributing to SF, respectively, and they are both
concerned, in a limited capacity, with the sequence of events
leading to SF. A component failure can contribute in 1 of 2 ways:
1) it can be an initiating event whereby its occurrence ‘when
the system is in a critical state’ causes system failure,
2) it can be an enabling event whereby its existence permits
another, initiator event, to cause SF.
Hence the 2 measures calculate the importance of components
in very different roles and are considered separately in Sec-
tions VI-A and B.
A. B&P Initiator Importance
B&P developed the measure of initiator importance in [12];
the measure is concerned with the failure of components acting
as initiating events and thus their occurrence coincides with SF.
This measure calculates component causes SF in .
This measure for coherent systems is:
(13)
the unconditional failure intensity of component ,
the -expected number of SF in a given interval.
For noncoherent systems, the total initiator importance mea-
sure is defined again in 2 terms. Term #1 is the failure of
component causes SF in the interval :
(14)
Term #2 is the initiator repair importance: repair of compo-
nent causes system failure in the interval :
(15)
To calculate the initiator importance of a component, an ex-
pression for must be obtained:
This is not considered in detailed here; for a detailed explanation
see [9].
To obtain an expression for , it is necessary to cal-
culate Birnbaum’s measure for each component (both repair and
failure). Having obtained an expression for , it is a
simple matter of substitution to calculate the initiator impor-
tance of a component; the initiator importance of component
is, using (14) and (15):
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B. Lambert’s Enabler Importance
Lambert introduced the measure of enabler importance in
[13], [14]; and is defined, for coherent systems, as the
failure of component allows SF in caused by the failure
of another component occurring . Lambert developed the
expression for this measure:
(16)
is the enabler and is the initiator.
However, (16) does not exactly specify component con-
tributes to SF in a given interval when another component, ,
causes SF . It is an approximation because it does not con-
sider the separate roles of components and in causing, or
contributing to, SF. For component to enable SF by the failure
of component , then and must occur in at least 1 minimal
cut-set together, and it must be the existence of 1 such minimal
cut-set that causes SF, for to enable to initiate failure.
To demonstrate this, consider the following example with
minimal CS: .
The Boolean expression for the top event and the system un-
availability function are:
(17)
Let be an enabler, and be an initiator; then, for to act as
enabler and contribute to SF when actually causes SF, they
must be in the same minimal CS. This is minimal CS 2, .
Therefore, must fail, and CS 1, 3, 4 must not fail. This means
that either works, or works from minimal CS 1; and works
or works to prevent minimal CS 3, and works to prevent
minimal CS 4. Thus the required circumstances are: and
and and ; ie,
Expanding this gives
is the actual enabler probability.
The probability calculated using the Lambert formula is:
C. Discussion
The results in Section VI-B for the Lambert expression and
the exact calculation, differ; (16) results in the extra terms:
These extra terms occur because the measure has failed to
consider that components and can occur separately in failure
combinations, and consequently affect the system state individ-
ually as well as jointly; (16) has accounted for the independent
role of the initiator but not the enabler.
The required probability is components and are crit-
ical to system state at time , and component has failed and
component fails , all weighted by the -expected number of
SF.
To calculate the required probability, first the criticality of
component and must be calculated; then a correction term,
which eliminates the s-independent contribution of and , is
required. The criticality of and is components and
are critical to system state , ie, the system is in a state at time
such that the failure of components and would cause SF.
The component is critical to the system state at time
is calculated as:
is system is in a failed state at time , and
is failed ,
is system is in a failed state at time , and
is working .
Because is linear in , the can be re-written
as:
Hence components and are critical to system state ,
can be obtained by extending this definition of criti-
cality. First, extend the notation:
the system is in a failed state
with components and failed .
Then the system is in a failed
state with component failed, and component working
.
Then components and are critical to the system at time
is:
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This is because represents the system is
in a failed state, and components and are failed . To elim-
inate the individual contributions of components and , (ie.,
if they are contained separately in minimal CS, then they make
an individual contribution to SF) then the system is failed
when is failed and is working , and the system is failed
when is working and is failed is subtracted. Finally, be-
cause this subtraction results in an underestimation, the the
system is in a failed state and components and are working
must be added.
Because is linear in , the can be re-written
as:
A correction term to be applied to can be derived to
account for the separate effects of components and on the
system state. It can be defined as the system is in a critical
state for components and , such that the failure of either or
alone is sufficient to cause the system to fail . To calculate the
correction term, a modified unavailability function, is
required; it considers all minimal CS of the system apart from
those containing both and .
The components and are critical to the system state such
that the failure of either or alone would be sufficient to cause
the system to fail is:
Thus the enabler importance of component , when component
causes SF, is:
(18)
The total enabler importance of component is the sum of the
enabler importance of when component initiates SF for
, is:
(19)
Consider the system introduced in (17); the enabler impor-
tance of component when component causes SF is calcu-
lated using this new measure:
For the modified unavailability function, the minimal CS con-
taining components and are extracted to give:
From (18)
This agrees with the required result obtained in Section VI-B.
D. Extension for Non-Coherent Systems
This measure can be extended for noncoherent analysis by
considering the role that both component failure and working
states play in SF. Thus, begin by considering the failure enabler
importance of component . The failure of component could
result in component being either FC or RC.
Thus the probability required for this circumstance: the
failure enabler importance of component when component
causes SF is:
“The probability that either component fails, leaving the
system FC for component , and component fails, or that com-
ponent fails, leaving the system RC for component , and com-
ponent is repaired. Weighted by the -expected number of SF
in the interval .”
The first stage is to calculate the components and are
FC at time and component is FC and component is
RC at time . These are in (20) and (21).
(20)
(21)
A correction term for each type of criticality is required to
ensure that the separate roles of component failures or repairs
are eliminated. Thus the first correction term needs to calculate
components and are FC, such that the failure of either
or alone is sufficient to cause SF . Similarly, the second cor-
rection term is component is FC, and component is RC,
such that the failure of component or the repair of component
alone is sufficient to cause SF . These are in (22) and (23).
(22)
(23)
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is the modified system unavailability function for and
is shown next; the union is taken for all prime implicants that
do not contain both and , and also do not contain either or .
is the modified system unavailability function for
such that,
Hence the failure enabler importance of component , when
component initiates SF, is:
(24)
The total failure enabler importance of component is:
(25)
The probability required for the repair enabler importance of
component when component causes SF is:
“The probability that either component has been repaired,
leaving the system FC for component , and component fails,
or that component has been repaired, leaving the system RC
for component , and component is repaired.”
By similar arguments to those used to derive the failure en-
abler importance, the repair enabler importance of component
, when component causes SF, is:
(26)
The total repair enabler importance for component is:
(27)
: component
is RC, and component is FC at time .
: components
and are RC at time .
: component
is RC, and component is failure critical such
that the repair of , or the failure of alone, is
sufficient to cause SF .
: compo-
nents and are RC such that the repair of , or
of alone, is sufficient to cause SF .
Again consider the Boolean expression in (1) whose system
unavailability function is in (2). The enabler importance of com-
ponent is calculated when component causes SF. The first
step is to obtain the expression for the 4 modified unavailability
functions required.
Now
Then from (24) and (25):
Note: Components and or and do not appear in any of the
prime implicants together; hence the failure enabler importance
of when causes system-failure is zero. Also, only compo-
nents and occur together in the prime implicant sets, thus as
anticipated, the term involving them is nonzero.
VII. APPLICATION TO A LEAK-PROTECTION SYSTEM
To demonstrate the results that the application of these non-
coherent measures provide, consider the leak protection system
in Fig. 1.
High-pressure gas flows through the pipes as part of a trans-
mission system. A gas leak can occur beyond the isolation valve,
due to a leak in either the pipe itself or at a flange. A gas-detec-
tion system detects a gas leak, and to simplify the analysis, it is
assumed to be perfectly reliable. Upon gas detection, the isola-
tion unit (which consists of the isolation valve and its controller)
closes the isolation valve, thus preventing the gas from flowing
through the valve and out of the damaged pipe. However, if iso-
lation is successful, the high-pressure gas will cause a hammer
effect on the valve, which can rupture the pipe in front of the
308 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 52, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2003
Fig. 1. Leak protection system.
Fig. 2. Fault-tree representing the possible causes of the top-event for the
system in Fig. 1.
valve. Due to the permanent ignition source located in this sec-
tion, it is essential to divert the gas flow elsewhere and to prevent
the pipe from rupturing; thus a pressure relief valve has been in-
stalled.
The system is designed to protect against an ignition fol-
lowing a gas release; hence the system is in a failed state if a gas
leak occurs and an ignition results. Fig. 2 shows a FT, which rep-
resents the possible causes of the top event: an ignition source
following a gas leak.
From this FT in Fig. 2, the prime implicant sets of the system
can be obtained using a bottom-up approach and applying the
consensus theorem to the implicant sets obtained. The 8 prime-
implicant sets of the system are:
LP, , , PRV ,
LP, IV, I1 ,
LP, C, I1 ,
LF, IV, I1 ,
LF, C, I1 ,
LF, , , PRV ,
LP, PRV, I1 ,
LF, PRV, I1 .
Prior to calculating the various measures of importance for
all the components, the role that each component failure/repair
could have in a system-failure must be considered. Then the ap-
propriate measures of importance can be used to analyze each
TABLE I
REPAIR AND FAILURE RATES, AND INSPECTION INTERVALS,
FOR THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS
TABLE II
COMPONENT UNAVAILABILITY AND UNCONDITIONAL FAILURE AND
REPAIR RATES
component’s contribution to SF. Both the isolation unit and the
pressure relief valve are safety systems; so they are passive com-
ponents and hence their failed and working (in the case of the
isolation unit) states can only act as enablers. The failure of the
remaining 3 components can act as either initiators or enablers.
Consider the situation whereby a gas leak exists at time , and
the isolation unit has failed prior to time , the system will be
in a failed state if an ignition source occurs before the leak is
repaired. In this case the gas leak is an enabling event and the
ignition source is the initiating event. Similarly if an ignition
source exists at some time and the isolation unit has failed
prior to time , then the occurrence of a gas leak while the ig-
nition source is present, will cause the system top event. Thus
the gas leak is the initiating event and the ignition source is an
enabling event.
This shows that, of the measures introduced, only the FV
measure, the measure of criticality, and the measure of enabler
importance, should be used to analyze the importance of safety
system components. On the other hand, all 5 measures of im-
portance can be used to analyze the importance of the remaining
3 components.
Appropriate failure and repair rates have been assigned to
each component as given in Table I. Inspection intervals have
been assigned to the valves, because it is standard to inspect such
dormant components in order to reveal a failure; in this case
they are inspected annually. From these rates, the component
unavailability and the unconditional failure and repair rates are
calculated from (26). The results are in Table II.
(28)
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TABLE III
RESULTS FOR THE VARIOUS IMPORTANCE MEASURES
(The equation number is provided for each result) IV  failure of IV; IV  repair of IV; C  failure of C; C  repair of C; PRV  failure of PRV
VIII. RESULTS
Birnbaum’s measure of repair and failure importance was cal-
culated for all components to enable calculation of the s-ex-
pected number of SF in a given interval. Table III shows the
results. The system is most likely to be in a critical state for LP
and least likely to be in a critical state for IV. The numerical
difference for Birnbaum’s importance of the LP and LF is very
small; thus the system is most likely to be in a critical state for
a leak in the pipe-work, (either pipe or flange). Thus: if system
performance is inadequate, then extra resources should be allo-
cated to:
• Reduce existence of the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the leaking pipe or leaking flange to be critical.
The conclusions here are limited because there is no real dis-
tinction between the 2 possible leaks: LP and LF. The criticality
measure can be used to analyze which of the 2 components is
most likely to be in a failed state when the system is failed. The
results highlight that the system is most likely to be in a failed
state due to LF. Thus the previous conclusion about resource al-
location can be made more specific. The main priority should
lie with:
• Reduction of the existence of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the system to be in a critical state for the LF.
• Increase the reliability of the flange.
The criticality measure also highlights that of the two safety
systems: it is the pressure relief valve that is most likely to be
in a failed state when the system is failed, thus if resources are
to be allocated to safety system improvement, efforts should be
concentrated on the PRV.
The results obtained from the initiator importance, in
Table III, again confirm these conclusions. LF is most likely to
cause SF. LP is ranked second and I1 is the least likely event
to cause SF.
The FV measure ranks the contribution each component
failure/repair makes to SF. The results are in Table III. The top
3 ranked events are: PRV, , and . Thus the isolation unit is
the most reliable of the 2 safety systems; this conclusion agrees
with that from the criticality results. Thus if safety systems are
to be improved, then the PRV should be done first. The isolation
valve is slightly more reliable than the controller. Hence efforts
to improve the isolation unit should be concentrated on the con-
troller. The FV measure also highlights that a leak in the flange
is more likely to contribute to SF than a leak in the pipe. This
again confirms that the flange is less reliable than the pipe itself.
Finally, the results obtained from the enabler measure are
considered. The failure of PRV is ranked highest; thus it is
most likely to be in a failed state at time , and enable a
component which can act as an initiator to fail and cause SF.
The components of C and IV, and enabling system failure are
ranked 2nd and 3rd, again highlighting that it is the more
reliable of the 2 safety systems. Also as anticipated, due to
component reliabilities and the prime implicants sets of the
system, the controller is more likely to fail and enable SF than
the isolation valve.
It is essential to consider importance measures in their en-
tirety; upgrading worst case, and reconsidering system impor-
tance, is not to be used because it can lead to alternating system
design.
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